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Abstract
Recent work in fairness in machine learning has
proposed adjusting for fairness by equalizing ac-
curacy metrics across groups and has also studied
how datasets affected by historical prejudices may
lead to unfair decision policies. We connect these
lines of work and study the residual unfairness
that arises when a fairness-adjusted predictor is
not actually fair on the target population due to
systematic censoring of training data by existing
biased policies. This scenario is particularly com-
mon in the same applications where fairness is
a concern. We characterize theoretically the im-
pact of such censoring on standard fairness met-
rics for binary classifiers and provide criteria for
when residual unfairness may or may not appear.
We prove that, under certain conditions, fairness-
adjusted classifiers will in fact induce residual
unfairness that perpetuates the same injustices,
against the same groups, that biased the data to
begin with, thus showing that even state-of-the-
art fair machine learning can have a “bias in, bias
out” property. When certain benchmark data is
available, we show how sample reweighting can
estimate and adjust fairness metrics while account-
ing for censoring. We use this to study the case of
Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) and demonstrate
that attempting to adjust for fairness perpetuates
the same injustices that the policy is infamous for.
1. Introduction
The spread of data-driven decision making to civic institu-
tions, spurred by the empirical success of machine learning
and the growing availability of individual-level data, raises
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new questions about the possible harms of learning from
data which is subject to historical bias. Unlike clean-cut pre-
diction problems in other domains, datasets of individuals
and their historical outcomes may reflect systematic bias due
to previously prejudiced decisions (Barocas & Selbst, 2014).
Recent work on fairness in machine learning proposes and
analyzes competing criteria for assessing the fairness of ma-
chine learning algorithms, where some adjustments attempt
to equalize accuracy metrics across groups (Corbett-Davies
et al., 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2017; Hardt et al., 2016). Other
work studies how historical prejudices may be reflected in
training data such that algorithmic systems might replicate
historical biases (Angwin et al., 2016; Lum & Isaac, 2016;
Kilbertus et al., 2017). We consider a model of biased data
where systematic censoring affects whether or not entire
observations appear in the training dataset. In such cases,
the available data are not representative of the eventual real-
world “test” population to which any resulting learned policy
will be applied. Our paper formalizes and characterizes how
systematic under- or over-representation of groups in the
dataset can hamper attempts to correct for fairness, leading
to residual unfairness on the target population of interest.
This important issue arises in almost all settings where fair
machine learning has been studied:
(1) Data on loan default can only be collected on those loan
applicants who were historically approved but is used
to learn approval policies applied to all applicants.
(2) Arrest data help build predictive policing models but
these data are disproportionately collected on individ-
uals in highly patrolled areas and may be subject to
further prejudice at the individual level, including racial
(Lum & Isaac, 2016).
(3) Risk assessment and intervention tools in child welfare
agencies are trained on cases which have been “screened
in” by caseworkers based on external reports (Choulde-
chova et al., 2018).
(4) Defendants may only flee and fail to appear if not de-
tained, so any flight risk score used for setting bail can
only be learned from data on defendants who were not
detained.
(5) Convict recidivism is impacted by sentence applied but
learned risk scores are applied to all convicts.
In these applications, systematic censoring screens out ob-
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Figure 1: Problem Setting: Censored Data. Outcomes are
only observed for those included in the dataset (Z = 1).
servations of individuals and their outcomes from a training
dataset. Such censoring may reflect historical decisions
made with limited access to information, heterogeneous
decision-makers, or the application of statistically discrimi-
natory rules (Arrow, 1973). Despite the intermediate screen-
ing, domain-level restrictions may require ensuring fair-
ness of any decision or prediction policy with respect to
the original population. We formalize this mechanism as
a data setting (Fig. 1) where a historical decision policy
Z 2 {0, 1} specifies whether an instance will be included in
the dataset. Systematic censoring may induce covariate shift
on population-level estimands, such as true positive rate,
as outcomes are observed in the training data only where
Z = 1. Notably, predictive tools built on these censored
datasets are actively being deployed: there is an opportunity
to improve upon standards of practice, but the structural
implications of systematically censored data ought to be
accounted for (Angwin et al., 2016; Capatosto, 2017; LJAF,
2015). Our contributions are as follows:
• We characterize when systematic censoring induces resid-
ual unfairness in terms of the distributions of the con-
ditional Bayes-optimal risk score across censored and
target groups.
• When benchmark data is available, we show how to use
sample re-weighting techniques to estimate accuracy met-
rics to adjust for fairness on the target population. We
show how the sample weights indicate what groups re-
main disadvantaged by residual unfairness.
• We demonstrate how systematic inclusion can affect fair-
ness adjustments on an empirical example with data from
the application of the Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) pol-
icy of the City of New York Police Department (NYPD).
In settings where datasets can be subject to historical prej-
udice and decision policies ought to be truly fair on the
general population, we argue it is paramount to carefully
consider and account for the sampling process to ensure
fairness on the true population.
2. Problem Setting
We consider the problem of learning a fair decision policy
(classifier or threshold rule on a regressor) from a dataset
where each decision instance is characterized by observed
covariates X 2 X (e.g., predictors of creditworthiness,
criminality, etc), protected class A 2 [m] = {1, . . . ,m}
(e.g., sex, race, etc), and label Y 2 {0, 1} (where Y = 1 is
generally interpreted as the favorable label, e.g., “will pay
back loan” or “will not reoffend”).
Fig. 1 illustrates the construction of a biased training dataset
in this setting. The indicator Z 2 {0, 1} specifies whether
an instance is included in the post-censoring training data
(e.g., “approved for a loan”) and another indicator T 2
{0, 1} specifying whether an instance belongs to the pop-
ulation to which the learned policy will be applied. For
example, if T is the constant 1, the target population is that
of all loan applicants. We sometimes call Z = 1 the logging
policy in analogy to logged-bandit learning (Kallus, 2017;
Swaminathan & Joachims, 2015), where the implementation
of a (often unknown) historical policy resulted in limited
bandit feedback on outcomes. Because a random sample
from the target population is generally not available, the
target population is different from the notion of a held-out
“test” dataset used to evaluate predictive accuracy .
We consider the problem of determining a policy assigning
labels Yˆ 2 {0, 1} that depends only on X,A but may be
randomized (so Yˆ ? (Y, Z, T ) | X,A). Labeled training
data (X,A, Y ) is available from the Z = 1 population, so
that only the conditional joint distribution ofX,A, Y | Z =
1 is characterized by this data. We may or may not also have
unlabeled data from the T = 1 population, X,A | T = 1.
For concreteness, when discussing fairness criteria, we con-
sider the specific fairness criterion of equality of opportunity
or equalized odds introduced by Hardt et al. (2016). The
adjustment determines a fair policy Yˆ from a (possibly dis-
criminatory) black-box binary predictor or score Rˆ without
access to the original training data. They identify two par-
ticular types of fairness, equal opportunity and equalized
odds, which require that a fairness-adjusted policy Yˆ be
independent of class A given a positive label Y = 1 or
given any label Y , respectively. For loan approval, equality
of opportunity requires that the policy treat truly creditwor-
thy individuals the same, independent of protected class
membership. Equalized odds prohibits abusing class mem-
bership as an unfair proxy for Y (e.g., via stereotyping or
racial profiling). For our setting, to be explicit, we define
these relative to an event:
Definition 1. A policy Yˆ satisfies equalized odds with re-
spect to (wrt) class variable A and event E if
Yˆ ? A | Y = y,E (1)
holds for y 2 {0, 1}. A policy satisfies equal opportunity
wrt A and E if eq. (1) holds for y = 1.
For brevity, we will say a policy is simply fair to mean
either equal opportunity or equalized odds. Hardt et al.
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(2016) determine such a policy by a post-processing step
given a score Rˆ using a constrained optimization prob-
lem over group-specific thresholds (potentially random-
ized), enforcing the constraints in eq. (1) on the true posi-
tive rate and/or false positive rate across groups while op-
timizing a given classification loss. Specifically, define
FEa (✓) = Pr[Rˆ  ✓ | Y = 1, A = a,E] as the conditional
CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the score given
the event E and Y = 1. For a given true positive rate ⇢, the
corresponding derived equal opportunity classifier at rate
⇢ is given by Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A], where ✓a = (Fa) 1(1   ⇢)
is the threshold corresponding to group a so that it has true
positive rate ⇢. Note that FZ=1a , F
T=1
a are the false negative
rates for a threshold classifier as evaluated on the censored
and target population, respectively. Naturally, a policy is
actually fair if it is fair on the population to which it is ap-
plied (here, T = 1). So, in seeking a fair policy per these
definitions, we seek a policy that satisfies equal opportunity
or equalized odds on the target population wrt class variable
A and the event T = 1, while the approach of Hardt et al.
(2016) applied directly to training data achieves fairness wrt
A and the event Z = 1. Throughout, we assume Rˆ 2 [0, 1].
3. Related Work
Fairness and Missing Data. Research on fairness and ma-
chine learning has considered some subcomponents of the
overall problem we study of learning fair policies from bi-
ased datasets. Hardt et al. (2016) formalize the criteria of
equal opportunity and equalized odds. Lum & Isaac (2016)
show that a predictive policing algorithm for drug enforce-
ment in Oakland, trained on police records, will perpetuate
disparate enforcement. Ensign et al. (2017) consider a dis-
crete model of how beliefs of crime rates in different areas
adjust after observing arrest rates, and propose implement-
ing the Horvitz-Thompson estimator via rejection sampling
of arrest observations in an “online” fashion. Lakkaraju et al.
(2017) identify a similar structural setting with “selective
labels” where they learn a decision rule for pre-trial risk
assessment from the decisions made from judges (which
affect whether or not the outcome of interest will be ob-
served). They leverage the heterogeneity of heterogeneous
decision makers using different decision thresholds to iden-
tify subpopulations for comparison but do not consider the
subsequent fairness of the learned policy.
Sampling Adjustment and Superpopulations. Sampling
adjustment and re-weighting is commonly used in the so-
cial sciences, medicine, and epidemiology for ensuring the
validity of population-level inference where there is pop-
ulation mismatch between studies and the population of
interest (Thompson, 2012; Freedman & Berk, 2008). The
classic Horvitz-Thompson estimator uses the inverse proba-
bility of sampling probability weights and is unbiased for
(a) Feasible regions (b) Equal opp. thresholds
Figure 2: Illustrative synthetic example: Comparison of
equal-opportunity or equal-odds adjustments derived from
censored or target population data.
population level estimates (Horvitz & Thompson, 1952).
Much of the work on fairness in machine learning has used
population-level statistics such as accuracy metrics (true
positive rate, false negative rate) as metrics for identifying
disparate impact. The case of sample selection bias was
studied in Zadrozny (2004) for classifier evaluation, without
regard for fairness impacts.
4. Residual Unfairness Under Disparate
Benefit of the Doubt: Bias In, Bias Out
We study how prejudicial biases in a dataset can lead to
residual unfairness, which persists even after fairness ad-
justment if error parity metrics assessed from the censored
dataset are used. We show that the residual unfairness that
remains even after adjustment will disadvantage the same
group that was prejudiced against before, in the training
data. This proves that even after fairness adjustment, fair
machine learning still has a “bias in, bias out” property.
An Illustrative Synthetic Example: Loan Application
To illustrate the potential impact of population mismatch
on fairness adjustments in a controlled setting, we consider
a synthetic example for loan approval. Suppose there are
two classes, with half of the population of loan applicants
in class 0 and the other half in class 1. We let T = 1 be
constant as we wish to consider the impact of our policy
on the whole population of loan applicants. We denote by
X1 the (normalized) number of bank accounts and by X2
the (normalized) number of delinquent payments on record,
including those for subprime loans.1
SupposeX is distributed as a standard bivariate normal con-
ditioned on class, with a mean of (1, 0) among individuals
1The setting is motivated by systematic associations found in
studies of the credit scores suggesting disadvantages for younger
applicants and recent immigrants due to policies incorporating
number of accounts (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1997; Rice & Swesnik, 2014).
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in the class A = 0 and a mean of (0, 1) among individuals
in the underprivileged class A = 1. Consider Y 2 {0, 1}
indicating whether the individual will pay back the loan
if it were approved. Suppose Y is logistic in X condi-
tioned on class with P (Y = 1 | X,A) =  ( TAX), where
 (t) = 1/(1 + e t) and  0 = (1, 1),  1 = (1.25, 1) so
that X2 is predictive of creditworthiness in both classes but
X1 is slightly more predictive in class A = 1 than in A = 0.
Suppose the training data comes from historically approved
loans where loans were approved based on X in such a way
that P (Z = 1 | X) =  ( Ta X).
In Figs. 2a–2b we consider deriving a fair classifier for loan
approval from the class-blind Bayes optimal score Rˆ =
P (Y = 1 | X,T = 1) = P (Y = 1 | X,Z = 1), which is
the same in training and target populations by construction
and which we assume is given (e.g., it can be identified from
the training data regardless of any covariate shift between
Z = 1 and T = 1; see Sec. 4.2). We simulate n = 100000
data points and censor the outcome for those with Zi = 0.
First we consider deriving an adjusted predictor from the
Bayes-optimal classifier Yˆ = I[Rˆ   0.5] by naı¨vely apply-
ing the method of Hardt et al. (2016). Fig. 2a shows the
space of achievable FPR-TPR in the training (censored) and
target (full) populations along with the optimal equalized
odds and equal opportunity rates corresponding to the sym-
metric loss `(y, y0) = I[y 6= y0]. As can be seen, there is a
significant discrepancy between the regions in the censored
vs. full population. Next, we consider deriving optimal
equal opportunity policies from the score Rˆ. Fig. 2b shows
the range of optimal policies, which is given by class-based
thresholds, as we range the exchange rate between type-
I and -II errors (false positives vs. false negatives). We
also show the result from using a reweighting approach that
we discuss in Sec. 5. We note that a naı¨ve application of
fairness adjustment provides insufficient compensation for
the unfairness toward the underprivileged class A = 1: for
every threshold on class A = 0, the corresponding thresh-
old on class A = 1 is always higher for the policy derived
in the naı¨ve manner compared to that derived either using
the full data or using our reweighting approach, such that
the spuriously fair policy is systematically and uniformly
harsher than necessary on the disadvantaged class.
4.1. Disparate Benefit of the Doubt
We now formalize the phenomenon illustrated in the exam-
ple as residual unfairness and study why and when it arises
in terms of the biases in training data due to existing preju-
diced policies. For concreteness, we focus on the equality
of opportunity criterion. Many of our results can be easily
extended to other observational fairness criteria. To quantify
the extent to which the criterion is satisfied or violated, and
in which direction, we define the inequity of opportunity.
Definition 2 (Inequity of Opportunity). The inequity of
opportunity between classes A = a and A = b wrt to event
E under policy Yˆ is defined as
✏Ea,b = P(Yˆ = 1 | E,A=a,Y=1 )  P(Yˆ = 1 | E,A=b,Y=1 )
Positive values in the target population, ✏T=1a,b > 0, indi-
cate unfairness against group b. Zero inequity between all
groups corresponds to equality of opportunity. A policy that
is adjusted to be equal-opportunity or equalized-odds fair
on the training data has ✏Z=1a,b = 0. Thus, any nonzero value
of ✏T=1a,b for such a policy constitutes a residual unfairness
corresponding to the additional unadjusted-for inequity in-
troduced by going from the Z = 1 to the T = 1 population.
Intuitively, if censoring induces a spuriously higher or lower
overall distribution of scores than in the true population, we
might learn a higher or lower threshold from the training
data. If the true distribution will have more people with
comparatively lower scores, the rate of false negatives will
increase in the true population. This is to be expected if the
censoring decision Z = 1 has itself an associated risk or
cost, such as giving a loan. Differences in the extent and
effects of this censoring between groups, which is what we
will define as disparate benefit of the doubt, can then give
rise to non-zero residual inequity. This may occur if the
censoring mechanism subjects the disadvantaged group to
harsher screening than the advantaged group, so that disad-
vantaged screened-in individuals have higher probabilities
of being positive (e.g., innocent or creditworthy) given the
observables X,A.
We next derive three sufficient conditions for residual un-
fairness. We explain how these can be interpreted in terms
of the logging policy Z = 1 bestowing disparate benefit
of the doubt with respect to the positive outcome Y = 1
on the different groups. This disparate benefit of the doubt
would be directly reflected in the distribution of risk scores
in the training and target populations, which we will show
necessarily leads to residual unfairness that disadvantages
the same group that received comparatively lesser benefit
of the doubt (or comparatively heightened suspicion), thus
perpetuating historical prejudices.
We first state a simple rephrasing of the residual inequity
of opportunity left by a fairness adjustment. Recall that
FZ=1a (✓), F
T=1
a (✓) correspond to the false negative rate
(FNR) when thresholding at ✓ on the training (censored)
and test populations, respectively. Let a(✓) = FZ=1a (✓) 
FT=1a (✓) denote the difference between true positive rates
in the test population and training (censored) population.
Recall that Yˆ is an optimal derived equal opportunity clas-
sifier based on the training data if Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] and
FZ=1a (✓a) = F
Z=1
b (✓b) for every two groups a, b.
2 For
short we refer to such a classifier as a derived equal oppor-
2Specifically, that the set of derived equal opportunity classi-
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tunity classifier.
Proposition 1. Let Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] be a derived equal
opportunity classifier. Then ✏T=1a,b =  a(✓a)  b(✓b).
Next, we define first-order stochastic dominance, which we
use to express our first characterization of disparate benefit
of the doubt.
Definition 3 (First-order stochastic dominance). Let F , G
be two CDFs. We write F   G whenever F (✓)   G(✓) 8✓.
CDFs describe the distribution of a population of real values.
The stochastic dominance F   Gmeans that the population
described by F has overall smaller values than the popula-
tion described by G. Specifically, F   G is equivalent to
saying that for each unit in the population described by F
we can find a nonnegative number such that, when added to
each unit, the whole population looks like that described by
G (Mas-Colell et al., 1997). That is, each unit from F can
be uniquely paired with a unit from G such that the former
has a smaller or equal value than the latter (allowing frac-
tional or infinitesimal “units”). Alternatively, F   G holds
if and only if the average of every increasing function in the
F population is smaller than or equal to the corresponding
average in the G population (Fishburn, 1980). This says
that any rational actor with an increasing utility function
would gain utility in choosing G over F and lose utility in
choosing F over G (or get the same utility).
Proposition 2 (Strong disparate benefit of the doubt). Sup-
pose that
FZ=1a   FT=1a and FZ=1b ⌫ FT=1b (2)
while not both are equalities, i.e., either FZ=1a 6= FT=1a
or FZ=1b 6= FT=1b (or both). Then every derived equal op-
portunity classifier has nonnegative inequity of opportunity
for group b relative to group a (✏T=1a,b   0) and at least one
derived equal opportunity classifier will have a strictly posi-
tive inequity of opportunity disadvantaging group b relative
to group a (✏T=1a,b > 0).
The condition in eq. (2) requires that the distribution of
scores among positive group-a members is overall smaller
in the training data than in the target population, while the
opposite is true for group b. Recall that scores represent
the probability of having the positive, favorable label (more
on this in Sec. 4.2). Thus, the condition says that positive
group-a members received more benefit of the doubt when
fiers that are optimal with respect to some trade off between type-I
and -II errors is exactly equal to the set of all such thresholding
classifiers requires only that we assume that, in each group A = a,
Rˆ is not worse than random guessing and that the ROC is convex.
Neither is without loss of generality as seen by only improving Rˆ
by conditionally (on A) negating Rˆ and/or randomizing its value
in nonconvex intervals between the endpoints.
being screened-in into the training data than positive group-
b members. Prop. 2 shows that this will necessarily lead to
group-b being further disadvantaged in the future even after
correcting for equality of opportunity.
In the context of loan application, where we can think about
the score as a credit score, eq. (2) means that the logging
policy (i.e., historical loan approval practice) effectively dug
deeper into the pile of creditworthy group-a applicants than
for group-b applicants, giving the former more benefit of the
doubt as to their creditworthiness based on their credit scores
than it gave the latter. Seen via the equivalent utility-based
interpretation of stochastic dominance, given any increasing
utility function, if eq. (2) holds then the logging policy is
losing utility on group-a via lax screening while gaining
utility on group-b by being less lax.
The complement (or, negative) of the score can be thought
of as a risk score: the probability of the unfavorable label.
Eq. (2) can equivalently be written as the opposite ordering
on risk scores rather than positivity scores. Thus, in either a
judicial bail- or sentence-setting context or in a predictive
policing context, eq. (2) means that the logging policy (i.e.,
historical criminal justice or policing practice) was harsher
on group b than on group a, screening-in lower risk scores
for innocent group-b members compared to the group-b
population while screening-in only higher risk scores for
group-a members, giving them more benefit of the doubt as
to their innocence based on observables.
If the CDFs are nowhere equal except for at 0 and 1 (where
they are always equal) then a strict version of Prop. 2 shows
that every derived equal opportunity classifier will be unfair.
Proposition 3 (Strong disparate benefit of the doubt,
strict). Suppose eq. (2) holds and that FZ=1a (✓) 6=
FT=1a (✓), F
Z=1
b (✓) 6= FT=1b (✓) for all ✓ 2 (0, 1). Then
every nontrivial derived equal opportunity classifier will
have strictly positive inequity of opportunity disadvantaging
group b relative to group a.
A nontrivial classifier is any classifier that is neither the
constant Yˆ = 0 nor the constant Yˆ = 1.
The conditions in Props. 2 and 3 are easy to interpret via
stochastic dominance but may be too strong to hold in prac-
tice. In particular, suppose the decision Z = 1 itself has a
benefit or risk related to whether Y = 1, as in the case of
giving a loan (benefit of earning the full interest over loan
term compared to risk of a default) or a police stop (benefit
of curtailing crime compared to costs, including societal, of
aggressive policing). Then, if the decision Z = 1 is exer-
cised rationally, then we would expect that the distribution
of scores is either overall higher (e.g., for loans) or overall
lower (e.g., for police stops) in the training population re-
gardless of group, i.e., both FZ=1a ⌫ FT=1a and FZ=1b ⌫
FT=1b or both F
Z=1
a   FT=1a and FZ=1b   FT=1b . (Al-
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(a) A(✓) across groups (b) False negative rates
Figure 3: Residual unfairness against due to weak disparate
benefit of the doubt in the loan application example.
though, prejudice in Z = 1 can be so overt and/or irrational
for this not to hold.) If this is the case, then the conditions
of Props. 2 and 3 cannot hold and we must relax them.
The next result shows that even if the stochastic dominance
holds in the same direction for both groups, if the magnitude
of the dominance is overall larger in one group compared
to the other for a large swath of thresholds then most de-
rived equal opportunity classifiers will actually be unfair
and disadvantage the historically disadvantaged.
Proposition 4 (Weak disparate benefit of the doubt, strict).
Let ✓, ✓ be such that
 a(✓) >  b(✓
0) 8✓, ✓0 2 (✓, ✓). (3)
Let Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] be a derived equal opportunity clas-
sifier. If ✓a, ✓b 2 (✓, ✓), then Yˆ induces a strictly positive
inequality of opportunity disadvantaging group b relative to
group a.
Note that, since A(0) =  A(1) = 0, we have that eq. (3)
holds for (✓, ✓) = (0, 1) if and only if the conditions of
Prop. 3 hold. Therefore, for general (✓, ✓) the former can
be understood as a relaxation of the latter.
We can illustrate the conditions of Prop. 4 in the synthetic
loan application example from the beginning of this section.
In Fig. 3b, we plot the two A functions and shade a large
interval where eq. (3) holds. In Fig. 3a, we plot the CDFs
FEA and further shade the corresponding regions of false
negative rates for which both ✓0 and ✓1 lie the previously
shaded interval. Taking complements, this shows that any
derived equal opportunity classifier adjusted to have equal
true positive rates of 0.58–0.95 on the training data will
disadvantage the underprivileged class despite one’s attempt
to adjust against this situation.
We can slightly relax the condition in eq. (3) whenever deal-
ing with groups that have disparate endowments of scores,
as in the example above where the scores of group 0 are
overall larger than those of group 1 in terms of stochastic
dominance.
Proposition 5 (Weak disparate benefit of the doubt on dis-
parately endowed groups). Let ✓, ✓ be such that
 a(✓) >  b(✓
0) 8✓, ✓0 2 (✓, ✓) : ✓   ✓0. (4)
Suppose FZ=1a ⌫ FZ=1b . Let Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] be a de-
rived equal opportunity classifier. If ✓a, ✓b 2 (✓, ✓), then Yˆ
induces a strictly positive inequality of opportunity disad-
vantaging group b relative to group a.
In the supplemental Sec. B we also include an illustration
of weak disparate benefit of the doubt in a real dataset of
credit card applications and payment defaults. In addition
to making more concrete our crediting example, this also
serves to illustrate the weaker condition in eq. (4).
All of our results in this section can be equivalently stated
for true negative rates instead of true positive rates, in which
case the corresponding conditions such as that in eq. (2)
can instead be interpreted as disparate suspicion, i.e., the
disparate scrutiny of truly criminal or credit-unworthy in-
dividuals. So, whereas our notion of disparate benefit of
the doubt corresponds to the phenomenon of “driving while
black” (Lamberth, 1998), our notion of disparate suspicion
would correspond to the phenomenon of “criming while
white” (Goldfarb, 2014). If either disparate benefit of the
doubt or disparate suspicion is present, a derived equalized
odds classifier will in fact violate equalized odds in a way
that disadvantages the same group that was disadvantaged
by the disparate benefit of the doubt or suspicion.
4.2. Interpretation of Scores Under MAR
In the above we interpreted the conditions in our results as
disparities in the distributions of positivity or risk scores
among different groups in the training and target popula-
tions. Specifically, we interpreted these scores as corre-
sponding to the probabilities of having a positive or nega-
tive label given observables. In full generality, however,
this probability might actually be different in the train-
ing and target populations, i.e., P (Y = 1 | X,A,Z = 1) 6=
P (Y = 1 | X,A, T = 1). Since naturally only the training
data is available at training we can consider the training-
population Bayes score Rˆ = P (Y = 1 | X,A,Z = 1) and
interpret disparities as disparities in benefit of the doubt
of positivity given this score. This is consistent with our
interpretation above.
However, whenever censoring Z = 1 is itself based on ob-
servables, the data will be missing conditionally at random
(MAR) and these probabilities will actually be the same so
that we can interpret the scores as simply the probability of
positivity given observables generally.
Assumption 1. (MAR) Z ? Y | X,A and T ? Y | X,A.
Under MAR, it is immediate that the Bayes score satis-
fies Rˆ = P (Y = 1 | X,A) = P (Y = 1 | X,A,Z = 1) =
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P (Y = 1 | X,A, T = 1), which can be consistently esti-
mated from training data. In fact, under MAR, the optimal
(unrestricted) decision function in X,A minimizing the av-
erage over Z = 1 of any loss in Y is the same as that
minimizing the average loss over T = 1.
MAR requires that the missingness is unrelated to outcome
after controlling for the observables. This assumption is
clearly satisfied in the common case when T = 1 is constant
and only X,A (or just X) were taken into consideration for
a randomized inclusion policy Z. In the examples laid out in
Sec. 1, this is an appropriate assumption because the censor-
ing mechanism does not observe outcomes Y a priori, only
observable characteristics (including the protected attribute).
However, violations of MAR may occur, for example in the
loan case if applicants may choose an outside option, self-
censoring the observation of a default while the availability
of these options is related to creditworthiness.
5. Fairness Assessment and Adjustment with
Biased Data via Sample Reweighting
In rare situations, we may have additional information about
the target population such as an unlabeled dataset. We next
show how we can use such data to evaluate accuracy metrics
on the target population, as long as data is MAR. This
will allow us to assess the residual unfairness of fairness
adjusted classifiers, as we will do in our study of SQF, and
to correctly adjust for fairness, as we have done in Fig. 2b.
Let p(x, a) = P(T=1|X=x,A=a)P(Z=1|X=x,A=a) be the propensity score
ratio between the target and training populations. This ratio
is a standard way to adjust for systematic covariate shift
for evaluating averages in the target (Horvitz & Thompson,
1952; Bottou et al., 2012). We next state how a weighting
score that’s equal to it up to proportionality in a can be used
for evaluating true positive rates.
Proposition 6. Suppose p˜(x, a) = r(a)p(x, a) for some
r(a) and Yˆ ? (Y, Z, T ) | X,A. Then, under Assumption 1,
P(Yˆ = 1 | Y = y,A = a, T = 1) is equal to
E[I[Yˆ=1,Y=y,A=a]p˜(X,A)|Z=1]P
yˆ2{0,1} E[I[Yˆ=yˆ,Y=y,Z=1,A=a]p˜(X,A)|Z=1]
(5)
Given p˜(x, a), the quantity in eq. (5) involves only the dis-
tribution of the training data. In practice, the expectations
in it can be estimated using empirical averages over the
training data. Therefore, if we can compute an appropri-
ate weighting function p˜(x, a), Prop. 6 provides a remedy
to the problem of biased data: we may simply replace the
condition in Def. 1, which involves an unknown distribution
X,A, Y | T = 1, with the condition that eq. (5) is constant
over a (for y 2 {0, 1} or for y = 1). In particular, to apply
the equality of opportunity adjustment on the target pop-
ulation, we need only compute the TPRs and/or FPRs of
Figure 4: Precincts by SQF stops vs. by NYC population
any blackbox predictor using the adjustment of eq. (5) and
proceed with the adjustment as usual.
Next we address when can we find an appropriate reweight-
ing score p˜(x, a). We consider two cases. If Z = 1 is a
subpopulation of T = 1 and our data consists of iid draws
from the target population population but where, naturally,
only theZ = 1 units are labeled, then may simply let p˜(x, a)
be the reciprocal of the conditional probability of being la-
beled, which may be estimated using a probabilistic clas-
sification algorithm such as logistic regression. This case
applies, for example, in the loan approval policy example
if the data includes the full loan applications, whether they
were approved, and whether the approved loans defaulted
or were paid back. If, however, our data consists only of
the labeled examples, as in the case of arrest and SQF data,
which contain only the arrests or stops made and, naturally,
never any information on those not made, then this case
does not apply. But, if we have an unlabeled dataset from
the target population, then we can separately estimate the
distribution of X,A in the training and target distributions.
Then we may let p˜(x, a) be either the ratio of densities of
X,A in T = 1 and Z = 1 or the ratio of densities of X in
T = 1, A = a and Z = 1, A = a.
In supplemental Sec. C we provide additional results charac-
terizing residual unfairness under MAR in terms of p˜(x, a).
6. Case Study: Stop, Question, and Frisk
We next study the Stop, Question, and Frisk dataset to il-
lustrate how residual unfairness may occur with real data.
We consider learning a predictor of criminal possession of a
weapon from this dataset using logistic regression and then
adjusting the policy to be fair on the training population.
The trained policy will be applied to the target population
of New York City at large, where it will be shown to in
fact be unfair. This residual unfairness can be explained
by disparities between the training population (SQF stops)
and the target population (NYC), which is evident from
the divergent geographic distributions of these two as seen
in Fig. 4. (Further details about SQF and the dataset are
provided in the supplemental Sec. D.)
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Figure 5: Disparate benefit of the doubt in SQF
Table 2: Residual unfairness in SQF predictive targeting
Equal Opportunity Equalized Odds
Z = 1 T = 1 Z = 1 T = 1
FNR FPR FNR FPR FNR FPR FNR FPR
Black 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.15
Black Hisp 0.11 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.15
White Hisp 0.11 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.12
Other 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.18
White 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.22
Goel et al. (2016) considered learning predictors from this
data as a way to assess the implied decision thresholds used
for determining pedestrian stops related to the criteria of
“reasonable suspicion.” While the authors suggest that a
logistic regression predictor of criminal possession of a
weapon could be used as a secondary filter applied on those
individuals targeted by officers, we instead consider training
such a predictive model to guide whom to target for a stop
and search and adjusting this targeting policy for fairness.
We consider race to be the protected class A, with val-
ues Black, Black Hispanic, White, White Hispanic, and
Other.3 Arrest data or SQF data only contain the arrests or
stops made and, naturally, never any information on those
not made. Since biases in the demographics of stop data
arise from disproportionate policing by location and po-
tential racial biases, we define the target population with
respect to demographic data about NYC precincts. Let-
ting X1 denote the precinct-encoding portion of the co-
variates and X2 denote all other covariates (which include
30 indicators of reasons for suspicion, sex, and location
or stop), we set P(X1, A | T = 1) to be the same dis-
tribution as that of the population of NYC. We further
assume that, once we condition on the main sources of
bias, (X1, A), the covariates X2 are not disproportion-
ate between the training and target distribution: we set
P(X2 | A,X1, T = 1) = P(X2 | A,X1, Z = 1). That
is, the main sources of systematic bias with respect to cen-
sored data are contained in X1 and A, while ancillary co-
variates X2 are not proxies for discrimination. We then
have that p˜(X,A) = P(A,X1|T=1)P(A,X1|Z=1) satisfies the conditions
of Prop. 6 so we need only estimate P(A,X1 | Z = 1),
P(A,X1 | T = 1). We estimate the former from the SQF
data and the latter from the 2010 American Community Sur-
vey data by matching census blocks to precincts and using
Laplace smoothing. We clip the ratio weights at 10.
Using the SQF data as is, we fit a logistic regression Rˆ to
predict the probability of innocence, that a search would not
recover a weapon from those suspected of criminal possess-
3Due to the relative size of the Asian/Pacific Islander and Native
American classes included in the original SQF dataset, we combine
them with the Other (U) class.
ing one based on the covariates X . Fig. 5 shows the FNR
discrepancies between training and target and the ROCs in
each. We consider deriving both an equal opportunity clas-
sifier and an equalized odds classifier for a stop and search
based on the SQF data to minimize false negatives and false
positives at an exchange rate of 25:1.
In Table 2, we report the estimated true positive and false
positive rates achieved by these classifiers both in the train-
ing and in the target population. The latter is computed
using Prop. 6. FNRs quantify the percent of innocents
wrongly targeted and FPRs quantify the percent of crim-
inals undetected. By construction, the adjusted-for rates
are equal in the training population (Z = 1). However, in
practice, residual unfairness remains in the target popula-
tion even after adjustment, and both of these supposedly
fair classifiers will systematically disadvantage the same
groups that were previously disparately targeted. For the
equal-opportunity-adjusted classifier, whereas only 11% of
white-non-Hispanic innocents are wrongly targeted, up to
20% of white-Hispanic, 16% of other, and 14–15% of black
innocents are wrongly targeted and harassed. Similar dis-
parities exist for the equalized-odds-adjusted classifier. The
equalized odds policy, having been subject to additional
constraints that require more randomization and hence less
dependence on observables, induces smaller but still signif-
icant disparities and Hispanics remain particularly dispro-
portionately burdened.
In all cases, after fairness adjustment, non-white individuals
were still unfairly disadvantaged in practice relative to white
individuals, thus perpetuating the same biases that SQF is
notorious for under the guise of a policy adjusted to be fair.
7. Conclusion
Our work characterizes the problem of residual unfairness,
which arises when policies learned from biased datasets are
adjusted for fairness but remain unfair in practice. We study
a general setting where the dataset is generated under a
prejudiced historical policy, which captures the structure of
many problem settings where fairness has been considered.
We prove that the same prejudices will be reflected in the
supposedly-fairness-adjusted policy.
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A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Prop. 1. Let 1  ⇢ = FZ=1a (✓a) = FZ=1b (✓b), which are equal by assumption. We then have that
✏a,b = (1  FT=1a (✓a))  (1  FT=1b (✓b))
= FT=1b (✓b)  FT=1a (✓a)
= ((1  ⇢)  FT=1a (✓a))  ((1  ⇢)  FT=1b (✓b))
= (FZ=1a (✓a)  FT=1a (✓a))  (FZ=1b (✓b)  FT=1b (✓b))
=  a(✓a)  b(✓b).
Proof of Prop. 2. Let Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] be any derived equal opportunity classifier. By Prop. 1, ✏a,b =  a(✓a)  b(✓b) and
by assumption  a(✓a)   0 while  b(✓b)  0.
By assumption, at least one of FZ=1a 6= FT=1a and FZ=1b 6= FT=1b holds. Suppose that FZ=1a 6= FT=1a . Then there is ✓a
such that FZ=1a (✓a) 6= FT=1a (✓a). Then a(✓a) > 0. Letting ✓b = (FZ=1b ) 1(FZ=1a (✓a)), we get that Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] is
a derived equal opportunity classifier with ✏a,b > 0. If instead FZ=1b 6= FT=1b then we’d have ✓b with b(✓b) < 0 and we’d
let ✓a = (FZ=1a )
 1(FZ=1b (✓b)).
Proof of Prop. 3. Let Yˆ = I[Rˆ > ✓A] be any nontrivial derived equal opportunity classifier. By Prop. 1, ✏a,b =  a(✓a) 
 b(✓b) and by assumption  a(✓a) > 0 and  b(✓b) < 0.
Proof of Prop. 4. Self-evident from Prop. 1.
Proof of Prop. 5. Self-evident from Prop. 1 after noting that FZ=1a ⌫ FZ=1b necessarily implies that ✓a   ✓b.
Proof of Prop. 6. We have that
P(Yˆ = yˆ, Y = y,A = a | T = 1) = E[P(Yˆ = yˆ, Y = y, T = 1 | X,A)I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[P(Yˆ = yˆ, Y = y | X,A, T = 1)P(T = 1 | X,A)I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[P(Yˆ = yˆ | X,A, T = 1)P(Y = y | X,A, T = 1)P(T = 1 | X,A)I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[P(Yˆ = yˆ | X,A)P(Y = y | X,A)P(T = 1 | X,A)I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[P(Yˆ = yˆ | X,A,Z = 1)P(Y = y | X,A,Z = 1)P(T = 1 | X,A)I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[P(Yˆ = yˆ, Y = y | X,A,Z = 1)P(T = 1 | X,A)I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[P(Yˆ = yˆ, Y = y, Z = 1 | X,A)P(T=1|X,A)P(Z=1|X,A) I[A = a]]/P(T = 1)
= E[I[Yˆ = yˆ, Y = y, Z = 1, A = a]p(X,A)]/P(T = 1).
The rest follows by Bayes law.
B. Weak Disparate Benefit of the Doubt in Credit Card Data
We consider the data from Greene (1992), which contains individual-level data on credit card acceptance, default on
payments or not (if accepted), information about individual income, derogatory reports on accounts, and other features of
creditworthiness such as self-employment indicators. The dataset also includes age, which has been a concern regarding
the fairness of credit scoring models (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1997). We construct a protected
class by defining A = I[Xage < F 1Xage(0.5)] as the indicator for being below the median age (31.67). To illustrate how
the direction of disparities can change depending on the Z = 1 policy we consider two scenarios. In both, we consider
the target population T = 1 to actually consist of all accepted applicants (rather than all applicants). First, we consider
Z = I[T = 1, Xi > F 1Xinc(.1)] where Xinc is income so that we further censor the lowest-income individuals from the
available data. Second, we also consider Z = I[T = 1, Xi > F 1Xinc per (.1)] whereXinc per is the income per dependent. In
T = 1, income is somewhat correlated with membership in the protected class (being young), with a correlation coefficient
⇢ =  0.32. However, income per dependent is very weakly correlated with being young, with a correlation coefficient
Residual Unfairness in Fair Machine Learning from Prejudiced Data
(a) a, censoring onXinc (b) FEA , censoring onXinc (c) a, censoring onXinc per (d) F
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Figure 6: Illustration of score disparities between censored and full training data. The dataset is from credit card applications,
where we additionally censor the population of accepted cardholders by income or income per dependent.
⇢ = 0.03. This is intuitive as the correlation of greater income by age is canceled out by the correlation of greater household
size with age.
In Fig. 6, we plot the FNRs FT=1A , F
Z=1
A in training and in target and the discrepancies A between them for both censoring
cases. First we study the case of censoring on Xinc. By inspecting the FNRs in Fig. 6b, we see that FZ=10 ⌫ FZ=11 .
Therefore, we can apply Prop. 5. In Fig. 6a we shade a region of thresholds that satisfies eq. (4). In particular, because of the
relaxation for disparately endowed groups, we can extend the region farther right than would be possible under eq. (3). In
Fig. 6b we shade the corresponding ranges of FNRs that, per Prop. 5, would lead to spuriously-fairness-adjusted classifiers
that actually induce an inequity of opportunity disadvantages the younger group A = 1.
Next we study the case of censoring on Xinc per. We first note that the disparate benefit of the doubt induced is now going in
the opposite direction (Fig. 6c) – so the spuriously-fairness-adjusted classifiers will disadvantage the older group rather
than the younger group. Although we have the same ordering of FNRs as before, FZ=10 ⌫ FZ=11 (Fig. 6d), the ordering
of  A’s is opposite and therefore eq. (4) does not offer a relaxation over eq. (3). We therefore apply the standard weak
disparate benefit of the doubt. In Fig. 6c we shade a region of thresholds that satisfies eq. (3). In Fig. 6b we shade the
corresponding ranges of FNRs, per Prop. 4, would lead to spuriously-fairness-adjusted classifiers that actually induce an
inequity of opportunity disadvantages the older group A = 0.
C. Residual Unfairness Under MAR
In this section we study several implications for residual unfairness under the MAR assumption. First we show that in rare
cases prejudice, if applied purely and directly on protected attribute alone, can actually be perfectly corrected for based on
training-data-based fairness adjustment. Second we study how disparities in importance weights can be used to characterize
the presence residual unfairness.
C.1. No Residual Unfairness if Inclusion Depends Only on Protected Attributes
We next show that if the censoring mechanism depends only on the protected attribute A that is to be adjusted for fairness,
then in fact there will be no residual unfairness and the true positive rates remain the same in the target population as in the
training population.
Proposition 7. Suppose P (Z = 1 | X,A) = P (Z = 1 | A) and P (T = 1 | X,A) = P (T = 1 | A). Then, under Assump-
tion 1, inequity of opportunity on training is the same as inequity of opportunity on target, i.e., ✏Z=1a,b = ✏
T=1
a,b .
Thus, residual unfairness occurs only when biased inclusion is heterogeneous based on covariates X , e.g., as in the case of
SQF where the application of stops differs based on both precinct and race. This is typical of the application areas where
fairness is of concern: censoring is usually disparate in large part via proxies for protected attributes.
C.2. Characterizing Residual Unfairness in Terms of Propensity Ratios Disparities
Under Assumption 1, we can characterize residual unfairness in terms of the reweighting estimates.
Residual Unfairness in Fair Machine Learning from Prejudiced Data
Proposition 8. Pr[Yˆ = 1 | Y=1A=a,T=1] > Pr[Yˆ = 1 | Y=1A=a,Z=1] if and only if
E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=0
i
< E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=1
i
This says that the TPR will be in actuality higher in the target population if the average ratio weights in the group of true
positives included in the dataset is greater than in the group of false negatives included. Intuitively, the predictor will be
more accurate in the target population if, due to censoring, positive examples that the predictor will be correct on were less
likely to appear in the training data.
We can use to characterize exactly when a classifier that satisfies equal opportunity on training will have residual unfairness
on target.
Corollary 9. Suppose Yˆ satisfies equal opportunity wrt Z = 1. Then ✏T=1a,b > 0 if and only if
E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=0
i
E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=b
Y=1,Yˆ=0
i < E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=1
i
E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=b
Y=1,Yˆ=1
i
This characterization follows from Prop. 8 and the fact that the true positive rates in training are the same under equality of
opportunity.
C.3. Proofs
Proof of Prop. 7. The result follows from applying Prop. 6 with Pr(Z = 1 | X,A) = Pr(Z = 1 | A) and iterating the
expectation over X:
P(Yˆ = 1 | Y = y,A = a, T = 1)
=
E[ 1Pr[Z=1|A]E[E[I{Yˆ = 1, Y = 1, Z = 1} | X]]]I{A = a}]P
yˆ2{0,1} E[
1
Pr[Z=1|A]E[E[I{Yˆ = yˆ, Y = 1, Z = 1} | X]]I{A = a}]
=
E[ 1Pr[Z=1|A] ]E[E[E[I{Yˆ = 1, Y = 1, Z = 1} | X]]]I{A = a}]
E[ 1Pr[Z=1|A] ]
P
yˆ2{0,1} E[E[E[I{Yˆ = yˆ, Y = 1, Z = 1} | X]]I{A = a}]
= P(Yˆ = 1 | Y = y,A = a, Z = 1)
Proof of Prop. 8.
 TPRa =
TPR⇤
TPR
=
Pr[Yˆ = 1 | Y = 1, A = a, T = 1]
Pr[Yˆ = 1 | Y = 1, A = a, Z = 1]
=
Pr[Yˆ=1,y=1|A=a,T=1]/Pr[Y 1|A=a,T=1]P
yˆ2{0,1} Pr[Yˆ=1,y=1|A=a,T=1]
Pr[Yˆ=1,y=1|A=a,T=1]/Pr[Y=1|A=a,Z=1]P
yˆ2{0,1} Pr[Yˆ=1,y=1|A=a,Z=1]
=
1
1+
Pr[Y=1|A=a,T=1]
Pr[Yˆ=1,y=1|A=a,T=1]
1
1+
Pr[Y=1|A=a,Z=1]
Pr[Yˆ=1,y=1|A=a,Z=1]
So
 TPRa > 1 ()
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 0 | A = a, T = 1]
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 1 | A = a, T = 1] <
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 0 | A = a, Z = 1]
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 1 | A = a, Z = 1]
We can apply Prop. 6:
 TPRa > 1 ()
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 1 | A = a, Z = 1]
E[I[Y = 1, Yˆ = 1]p(X,A) | Z=1A=a]
<
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 0 | A = a, Z = 1]
E[I[Y = 1, Yˆ = 0]p(X,A) | Z=1A=a]
and the identification that E[I{Y = 1, Yˆ = 0}p(X,A) | Z=1A=a] = E
h
p(x,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=0
i
Pr[Y = 1, Yˆ = 0 | Z=1A=a]:
 TPRa > 1 ()
1
E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=1
i < 1
E
h
p(X,A) | Z=1,A=a
Y=1,Yˆ=0
i
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D. Information on Stop, Question and Frisk
Stop, Question, and Frisk is a program which allows police officers to stop citizens in public, question, and possibly search
them, under reasonable suspicion of a crime but not enough probable cause for an arrest (Goel et al., 2017). Around 600,000
people were stopped in 2011, and around 90% of stops led to no evidence of a crime (Keefe, 2011). Each officer is required
to file an individual report after a stop detailing individual characteristics (including physical attributes of the suspect and
location) and reasons for the stop, leading to relatively rich context about each individual decision (NYCLU, 2017).
SQF was studied by statistical researchers and adjudicated in the court case Floyd v. City of New York for discrimination on
the basis of race and national origin. The program has been controversial since the demographic makeup of stops in the
data systematically misrepresents the population of NYC at large due to disparate patrol levels and implementation of SQF
by NYPD precinct, which correlates with demographics, as well as the potential for racial biases at the individual level.
These demographic imbalances have been studied and analyzed judicially, discussed alongside evidence of administrative
and structural deviation in application of SQF practices (Goel et al., 2017; Gelman et al., 2007). Some of the covariates
themselves may reflect proxy indicators for discrimination. In the SQF data, for example, recorded reasons for stop include
whether the suspect was actually engaging in a crime, was a known criminal, or exhibited “furtive movement”. The potential
for some of these reasons to be proxies for discrimination was noted by Judge Scheindlin in the court case of Floyd, et al. v.
City of New York.
